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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
RANDALL FRANK MARK,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

TAMRA JEAN HANCOCK MARK,
and JANIS PECK HANCOCK,
Defendants and Respondents.

13733

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action between natural parents of a minor
child to determine permanent cusitory of the child. The
parties obtained a divorce in the State of Alabama where
the Court temporarily deprived both parties of custody
on the ground of immaturity and awarded temporary
custody of the child to the Defendant's step-mother.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment
in favor of the Defendant, the Plaintiff appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were residents of the State of Utah and
were married in this State. The parties moved to Alabama because of the Plaintiff's enlistment in the United
States Air Force. While in Alabama, Defendant initiated
proceedings for divorce and a Decree of Divorce was issued
in favor of the Defendant. The minor child of the parties
was temporarily placed in the custody of the Defendant's
step-mother who resided in Salt Lake City, Utah, and
visitation privileges were granted both the Plaintiff and
the Defendant. The Alabama Court held that both parties were immature and directed that action for permanent custody be initiated in the State of Utah (R-37, 38).
Plaintiff initiated an action for permanent custody of
the minor child on the 19th day of December, 1973. The
named Defendants in that action were the Defendant,
Tamra Mark, natural mother of the minor child, and Janis
Peck Hancock step-mother of the Defendant Tamra Mark.
Janis Peck Hancock defaulted in answering the Plaintiff's
complaint and on the 25th day of January 1974, her default was entered (R-26).
The case was tried to the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, District Judge, on the 29th day of April, 1974.
Prior to the hearing, the Plaintiff moved the Court for
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an order to compel a pre-hearing evaluation of both parties but the motion was contested by the Defendant and
the Court denied the motion for the pre-hearing evaluation (R-ll, 20).
The trial was tried on the 29th and 30th of April
1974 and on May 1, 1974 the Court entered its Memorandum Decision, holding that the Defendant and natural
mother of the minor child was a "fit and proper person
to be awarded permanent care, custody, and control of
said minor child" (R-14).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A PRE-HEARING
CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATION OF THE
PARTIES.
The Plaintiff, on April 2, 1974 moved the Court for
an order directing the Plaintiff and Defendant to submit
necessary information for a child custody evaluation to
be conducted by the Salt Lake Mental Health Division.
Although no written objections were filed by the Defendant, counsel for the Defendant appeared at the time of
hearing and objected to the child custody evaluation on
the grounds that such evaluation would be a violation of
the Defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. Under Section 30-3-17
and 30-3-17.1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
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the Utah Legislature granted the District Courts authority to require either or both spouses to appear before
counselors, physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, social
workers, or other specialists and granted such experts the
right to submit written evaluations of the prospects or
prognosis without devulging facts or revealing confidential disclosures. Certainly these statutory provisions indicate the Legislature was cognizant of the parties' constitutional rights and these provisions do not violate these
rights in any way. The requested evaluation is hardly
distinguishable from the present adoption evaluations required in adoption proceedings in the State of Utah.
The Defendant may argue that the consent of both
parties is required for the evaluation to be conducted
pursuant to Section 30-3-15.2 Utah Code Annotated 1953
as amended. However, that provision does not dictate
a joint agreement between parties before an investigation
can be ordered by the Court. The Section merely states
that a written report may be introduced in evidence when
both parties consent to it in writing. Obviously if a party
objects to the written report being submitted as evidence,
the Court is then empowered to proceed under Section
30-3-17.1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 to receive a written
evaluation of the prospects and prognosis without receiving specific facts or without violating confidential disclosures. (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, it seems inconsistent for the Defendant
to object to an evaluation or to an investigation of at
least the immediate environment in which the minor child
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is proposed to be placed when she is then permitted to
come to Court and testify to the adequacy or excellence
of the environment in which she proposes to place the
child. This situation in analogous to cases where a party
in a civil action claims a privilege under the Fifth Amendment and attempts to frustrate the due process of the
law. Argument on this point will be made under Point
II of Plaintiff's Brief.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A
FINDING THAT THE BEST INTEREST OF
THE MINOR CHILD IS BETTER SERVED
BY AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE MINOR
CHILD TO THE DEFENDANT AND NATURAL MOTHER.
The Defendant throughout the entire trial contended
that the Plaintiff's burden was to show that the Defendant, natural mother, was unfit, immoral, or incompetent
before the presumption in favor of the mother was overcome. All of the recent cases decided by this Court consistently hold that the controlling consideration in cases
such as this is the "best interests of the child". This position is most clearly illustrated in Hyde vs. Hyde, 22 U.
2d 429, 454 P. 2d 884 (1969). The Court, in affirming the
lower Court's award of custody to the father, indicated
that the welfare of the child was the paramount consideration under Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated 1953.
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The Court quoted Steiger vs. Steiger, 4 U. 2d 273, 293 P.
2d 418 (1956) and stated:
"The divorced mother has no absolute right
to custody b u t . . . the policy of our decisions has
been to give weight to the view that all things
being equal, preference should be given to the
mother in awarding custody of a child of tender
years . . ."
The Court further stated:
"The Defendant has no absolute right to
custody . . . because she is the mother. At best
she is in an advantaged position when all things
are equal. However, when things are not equal
as regards the ability of the parties to care for
and properly rear the child, then any advantage
customarily given to the mother must be denied,
and the award made so as to provide for the best
interest and welfare for the child."
It is obvious that the decisions today look beyond
the maternal presumption regardless of the tender years
of the child. The proposed permanent home of the child,
the child's physical, emotional, educational, psychological,
and financial needs are to be considered all with the view
towards determining what best serves the child and obviously differs from past decisions which refer to the
rights of the parents as compared to the rights of the
child in question. In Stocks vs. Stocks, 14 U. 2d 314, 383
P. 2d 923 (1963) the Court stated:
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"The rule which favors the mother is only
one of many factors which must be considered
and is applicable only if all things are equal. . ."
"The instant case is a good example of the
undesirable and impractical results that would
emanate from adopting the view urged by Plaintiff that the Court must invariably, in all circumstances, award the custody of children under 10
to the mother unless she is found to be an immoral or incompetent person."
As indicated, the Defendant's position throughout
the entire trial presumed that the Court must find that
the Defendant was unfit or immoral or incompetent before the Plaintiff, the natural father, could prevail in the
action. The Memorandum Decision also suggests that
perhaps the natural mother would have to be shown to
be unfit before the natural father could prevail. The precise wording of the Memorandum Decision states:
"In this matter the Court finds that the Defendant as mother of the minor child is a fit and
proper person to be awarded the permanent care,
custody and control of said minor child" (R-14).
Plaintiff proceeded on the theory that the best interest of the child would better be served by the total
circumstances which the Plaintiff could provide as compared to that which the Defendant could provide. The
evidence at the trial showed that the Plaintiff was a
veteran, having obtained an honorable, hardship discharge
from the United States Air Force upon recommendation

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
of the Court in Selma, Alabama (R-37). The Plaintiff
is presently enrolled at Weber State College majoring in
Police Science with a minor in Psychology and is an A
student. He presently resides with his parents in Salt
Lake City and the parents have consented to providing
him with the facilities with which to raise the minor child
and to provide the necessary care and supervision for the
child during Plaintiff's attendance at college or whenever
he was unable to be with the minor child. The testimony
further indicates that the child's room had been recently
remodeled to accommodate the child and that the yard is
completely fenced to insure the safety of the child (3P.
thru 9P.). The neighborhood provides adequate playmates
for the child. The medical needs of the child, since his arrival here in Salt Lake City has been provided primarily by
the Plaintiff or the paternal grandparents of the minor
child. The actual custody of the minor child has been primarily with the Plaintiff or the paternal grandparents of
the minor child as indicated by the records kept by Plaintiff and the paternal grandparents (Exhibit 14P. and
15P.). The paternal grandmother is a housewife and is
always available and willing and able to care for minor
child in the absence of the Plaintiff.
In contrast, the Defendant, the natural mother, resided in a two bedroom apartment without any special
accommodations for the minor child (R-63 thru R-65).
The Defendant shared the apartment with a roommate
on the third floor of the apartment complex and the Defendant would utilize the living room couch as her sleeping quarters during the visitation by the minor child al-
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though the Defendant characterizes the second bedroom
as "his bedroom" (R-65). It is obvious that the accommodations which she provided for the minor child were
physically inadequate and that in fact the minor child
did not have "a separate bedroom of his own" but was
compelled to share all of the living quarters with the other
two occupants. In the absence of the Defendant the child
is shuffled between the commercial nursery, a maternal
great grandmother and the step-mother of the Defendant.
The step-mother would obviously be more capable, physically to care for a minor child of two years except for the
fact that she had six minor children of her own and had
an infant less than one year old and could not accommodate still another. The maternal great grandmother Mrs.
Hancock, was the principal baby sitter when the child
was not in a commercial nursery. She testified that she
was competent to care for a child two years old and had
no apparent handicaps or nervous conditions which might
tend to detract for her capacity as a baby sitter of two
year old boy. Notwithstanding this fact, however, she
admits that she has had constant headaches for years
and that she has taken pain pills, tranquilizers, and barbiturates for her headaches and has taken pain killers
for her headaches. She further confirms that her headaches have persisted for over 30 years and that she goes
to a doctor all the time (R-69 thru R-71).
The Defendant admits to the use of narcotics some
four years ago. The person whom the Defendant indicated she intended to marry also utilizes narcotics and
the Defendant's roommate utilizes narcotics. Although
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there is no testimony in the trial that the Defendant used
narcotics or drugs after the incident to which she testified
the testimony was clear that she permitted the use of
narcotics by her roommate and by her fiance in the presence of the minor child.
The Defendant's total efforts in obtaining custody
of the minor child was shrouded by deception and began
as early as the hearing in Selma, Alabama where she
convinced her step-mother that a letter was needed from
the family Bishop to prevent the child from being placed
in a foster home when in fact such was not the case. She
accused the Plaintiff of psychiatric abnormalities in Alabama only to have the Plaintiff found normal by psychiatrists in Alabama. She again accused the Plaintiff of the
same psychiatric abnormalities prior to and during the
trial in Salt Lake City. Yet when Plaintiff attempted to
obtain an evaluation of both parties and the environment
in which the child was proposed to be raised, the Defendant objected to Plaintiff's motion for such an evaluation.
Although the factual circumstances are distinguishable, it is analogous to Gerard vs. Young, 20 U. 2d 30, 432
P. 2d 343, where the Utah Supreme Court ruled that a
person may not rely on the Fifth Amendment in civil
cases to frustrate an action and prevent the other due
process of the law. In so holding, the Court, citing Wigmore and Am. Jur. stated:
"The constitutional provision may not be set
aside, but the only purpose was to make the State
convict an accused person by evidence other than
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admissions of the Defendant himself. It was not
intended to allow a party in a civil action to escape civil liability by claiming the privilege. He
need not incriminate himself, but he has no constitutional assurance that the jury must seal up
their minds to the only reasonable inference
which could be drawn from his failure to give
evidence that would throw light upon the matter
before the court." (Emphasis added.)
Citing McCormick on Evidence, page 163, section 80,
the court states:
"Under familiar principles an unfavorable
inference may be made against a party not only
for destroying evidence, but for the mere failure
to produce witnesses or documents within his
control. No showing of wrong or fraud seems to
be required as a foundation for the inference that
the evidence if produced would have been unfavorable. Why should not this same conclusion
be drawn from the party's active interposing of
a privilege to keep evidence out?"
The Court also cites Phillips vs. Case, 201 Mass. 444,
87 N. E. 755:
"It is a rule of law that the objection of a
party to evidence as incompetent and immaterial,
and insistent upon his right have his case tried
according to law, cannot be made a subject of
comment in the argument. On the other hand,
if evidence is material and competent except for
a personal privilege of one of the parties to have
it excluded under the law, his claim of the privilege may be referred to in argument and considered by the jury, as indicating his opinion
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that the evidence, if received, would be prejudicial to him . . . ".
As earlier stated, the facts on all of the above citations differ from the facts of the case at bar. However,
all of the circumstances are analogous, namely; a party
in civil action cannot frustrate due process of law by
claiming the privilege of the Fifth Amendment. At least,
the evidence withheld under such claim is to be presumed
unfavorable.
If we can safely assume that a pre-hearing evaluation
would have provided information regarding accommodations made by Defendant for the minor child, information
on Defendant's mental and emotional qualifications to
care for a minor son, information regarding the use of
narcotics or drugs, information regarding Defendant's
fiance, roommate, grandmother, step-mother and all other
pertinent information, we should be able to assume from
Defendant's claim of privilege from consenting to the
evaluation that the evidence would have been unfavorable
or at least a substantial and material portion of the evidence would have been unfavorable.
A comprehensive article on custody matters was
printed in the Marquette Law Review, Vol. 56, Fall 1972,
page 51, No. 1. The article cites the proposed Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, which was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, August, 1970.
The article points out the various factors which the
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courts have based custody decisions on and Lewis vs.
Lewis, 252 Wis. 576, 32 N. W. 2d 227 (1948) is particularly in point. The authors of the article, members of the
Wisconsin Bar Association and the Wisconsin Judiciary
state:
"In Lewis vs. Lewis, the court approved finding that the wife was unfit because of illicit relationship, which started while her husband was
in the Armed Forces and continued after his return, showed so great a disregard or proprieties
as to warrant awarding custody to the husband.
The wife's unwillingness to give up her improper
association and consider conventionalities required awarding custody to the husband." (Pg.
64.)
In the case at bar, the record is practically devoid of
any material evidence which could reasonably lead the
court to hold that the Defendant has met the test of showing that her conduct, her emotional and physical qualifications, her financial circumstances and the environment
in which she proposes to place the minor child in question,
are all in the best interest of the child.
There is ample evidence, on the other hand, to prove
that the best interest of the child is served by awarding
the custody of the minor son to the Plaintiff. In addition
to the benefits earlier referred to, the testimony of the
psychiatrist indicates that, although brief, the one visit
of the Plaintiff and his minor son gave the psychiatrist
a stress situation where the psychiatrist could observe
the interaction between father and son. The doctor's tes-
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timony, probably the most important of all the testimony
before the court, is quoted in part below:
"Well, my evaluation of both father and
child was to include a normal . . . include a mental status examination, see how they functioned
in terms of their emotional status describing their
behavior, attitude, thinking and feelings, how
they responded intellectually to questions and
so forth and I did perceive them both on that
basis" (R-146, 147).
". . . Mr. Mark is an above average young
man who is a very physical individual who has
in spite of a rather strong physical interest begun
to explore the intellectual foundation for child
rearing and has begun to derive a philosophy as
to how he might best interact with the child
that he is able to use the resources about him in
terms of influencing him for appropriate child
rearing and as in the illustration that I gave, he
was able to deal with an appropriate behavior"
(R-147, 148).
"He was able to deal with negative feelings.
He was consistent. He was compassionate. He
was firm I would have to say in dealing with the
child's distress. In setting limits he did quite
well and that he had good judgment and he is
an intelligent young man" (R-148).
"As the child became distressed and upset
this would be an opportunity to see how a parent
deals with an upset child and Mr. Mark was compassionate, was understanding of his situation,
described what was going on to me, how he felt
about it, what he perceived the child to be, what
his distresses were and he dealt with him firmly
but quite fairly and appropriately and did not

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
become unduly distressed even though it would
be impossible . . . it would be possible to distress
a person" (R-145, 146).
The evidence before the Court does not justify finding that the best interest of the minor child is served by
awarding his custody to the Defendant mother and does
support a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE
EVIDENCE PROFFERED.
On May 3, 1974 the Plaintiff moved the Court for
a rehearing based on newly discovered evidence which
the Plaintiff could not have discovered on the date of the
trial. The motion for rehearing was heard on the 10th
day of May 1974 and attorney for the Plaintiff and attorney for the Defendant appeared before the Court. The
Court was without a reporter.
The Plaintiff proffered evidence to the Court regarding the arrest of the Defendant Tamra Mark, on the 28th
day of April 1974 at 7:00 A.M. for unlawful possession
of a controlled substance and indicated that the counsel
for the Plaintiff had in his possession a copy of the booking sheet regarding the arrest. Counsel for Plaintiff further proffered evidence which would tend to show that
Defendant's fiance Michael Nuzzolo, Defendant's roommate and Defendant's roommate's boy friend were also
arrested together with the Defendant on the west side
of South Salt Lake.
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The Court indicated that even if the Plaintiff were
able to prove the proffered evidence the Court would not
be inclined to change its ruling regarding the custody of
the minor child in question and therefore denied Plaintiff's motion for rehearing.
The Plaintiff concedes that generally, motions for
new trials are viewed with disfavor and a ruling of a trial
court will not be overturned unless there is a showing of
an abuse of the discretion of the trial court. Jones Mfg.
Co. vs. Wilson, 15 U. 2d 210, 390 P. 2d 127. The cases
generally held that a motion for new trial would be
granted if the party moving for the new trial shows that
the evidence was discovered since the trial, that the evidence could not be discovered before trial with due diligence, that the evidence is material, that the evidence is
not merely cumulative or impeaching and that the admission of such evidence in a new trial would probably
bring about a different result. Universal Inv. Co. vs. Carpets, 16 U. 2d 336, 400 P. 2d 564. VanDyke vs. Ogden
Savings Bank, 48 U. 606, 161 P. 50, the Court, referring
to 3 Graham and Waterman on New Trials the Court
stated:
"The rule that newly discovered evidence
must not be cumulative, though well settled, has
an occasional exception. Where, by admitting it,
what was before mysterious and doubtful becomes plain and certain, so that if received, the
most obvious justice, and, if rejected, the most
palpable injustice will be done, courts do not
hesitate to adopt the former alternative."
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In the case at bar the Defendant's character, emotional and mental stability and propriety as well as the
Plaintiff's is of great concern to the Court because of the
welfare of the minor child in question. At trial some evidence was introduced which tended to show that the
Defendant, natural mother of the minor child, used narcotics in the past and permitted the use of narcotics in
the presence of the minor child. This testimony, however,
was denied far the most part by the Defendant or by her
fiance who testified at trial. The newly discovered evidence goes to the heart of the Defendant's qualification
as a mother and as a person having legal custody of the
minor child, especially in view of the fact that the child
shared living facilities with the persons who, according
to the Plaintiff's proffered evidence, were arrested for
illegal possession of a controlled substance.
The proffered evidence, if proved, impeaches the
Defendant and her fiance since the Defendant testified
that except for some four years past she had not used
any drugs or narcotics and the Defendant's fiance testified that he had never seen the Defendant use any narcotics or drugs. The proffered evidence, if proved, would
also shed light on the Defendant's moral character since
it would show that the Defendant and her companions
were booked at 7:00 A.M. the morning before the trial
at an address other than at her residence. If the Defendant was in fact booked at the early hour of 7:00 A.M.
it could be reasonably assumed that the actual time of
arrest would be at least an hour prior to the actual book-
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ing which could reasonably lead to the presumption that
the Defendant and her fiance and the Defendant's roommate and her roommate's boy friend spent the night together at the address where the Defendant was arrested
in South Salt Lake.
The proffered evidence, if proved, would make absolutely clear the Defendant's disregard for the welfare of
the minor child and for the oath which she took in court
prior to her testimony.
The newly discovered evidence which was proffered
by the Plaintiff together with the evidence before the
Court would clearly show that the best interest of the
child would not be served by awarding his custody to the
Defendant mother but rather to the Plaintiff fattier and
and the Court erred in refusing to grant Plaintiff's motion
for new trial.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that the judgment of the lower
Court should be reversed and judgment entered in favor
of the Plaintiff or in the alternative a new trial should
be granted on the following basis:
1. The Court erred in refusing to grant the Plaintiff's motion to compel the Defendant to submit to a child
custody evaluation notwithstanding the fact that written
report could not have been introduced into evidence since
the Court had authority to order such an evaluation and
to receive a written evaluation of the prospects and prog-
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nosis without receiving specific facts or without violating
confidential disclosures. (Emphasis added.)
2. The Court erred in granting judgment for the
Defendant since the only affirmative evidence before the
Court is evidence in favor of the Plaintiff and the Defendant submitted no independent affirmative evidence
to show that the best interest of the child would be better
served by awarding the custody of said child to the Defendant and because the Court appeared to have proceeded on the theory that the Plaintiff had the burden
of proving Defendant unfit, immoral, or incompetent before the presumption in favor of the mother could be overturned.
3. The Court erred in refusing to grant Plaintiff's
motion for rehearing because the proffered evidence, if
proved, would clearly indicate that the Defendant and
her fiance utilized narcotics and drugs and that the child
would be placed in a surrounding where such activities
were permitted in his presence and would have rebutted
any inference that the child's best interest and welfare
would be served by placing the child in the custody of the
Defendant mother.
Respectfully submitted,
KENNETH M. HISATAKE
Attorney for Appellant
Suite 2B, 150 South 6th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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